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Three decades ago, Deng Xiaoping steered China on to the path of “re-form” and “opening” to the outside world. Twenty years later, in 2001,as part of the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005), Chinese authorities
unveiled a strategy for Chinese companies “going abroad” (zouchuqu 走出
去, articles 1 and 2). This was a veritable turning point in China’s relations
with the world at large, in both the economic and political domains. This
strategy grew in strength in the first decade of the twenty-first century: by
late 2009, not only had annual exports risen to $1,200 billion and foreign
exchange reserves to $2,400 billion, but in a sign that Chinese firms had ar-
rived on the international scene, they had by then set up more than 13,000
enterprises overseas, across nearly 180 countries. Chinese direct investment
abroad totalled $2,500 billion, and the number of people leaving China an-
nually passed 50 million, according to Jin Canrong (article 2). While the Tenth
Five Year Plan spoke merely of “going out actively and gradually” (jiji wentuo
de zouchuqu 积极稳妥地走出去), the eleventh (2006-2010) referred to
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sources through market forces: if demand for food is too great in relation
to national production, farm product prices will rise and contribute to raising
the value of agricultural land, thus leading farmers to resume cultivating
land they had previously abandoned.
To tackle the supply-demand imbalance, Mao recommends developing
national and international trade in food products. That, he says, would not
only help secure food supplies, but would also bring down the total cost of
food production. Mao cites the example of Japan and South Korea as food
importing countries.
However, the population levels of these importing countries are hardly
comparable to that of China. Also, a shortfall in national agriculture pro-
duction would have an impact on international markets, raising the risks of
unstable world prices for agricultural products.
The accentuation of governmental efforts at moderating rising prices of
food products seems to indicate that regulation through market forces is
not the best option.
Zhang concludes that China’s urbanisation is in any case an inexorable
trend, that social problems stemming from land conversion are thus un-
avoidable, and that the process should either be strengthened or suspended.
While hoping that urbanisation would lead to positive fallout in rural areas
too, the central government apparently has no choice but to face up to di-
vergent interests – its own, those of local governments, those of farmers,
and those of the rest of the population.
z Translated by N. Jayaram
1. According to Fan Libo, there are three strategic paths (zhanlüe lujing 战略路径) for development,
which are respectively linkage (hulian 互联), leverage (ganggan 杠杆), and localisation (bentuhua
本土化), hence the term “3L method.”
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“going out further” ( jinyibu zouchuqu 进一步走出去 ), and the ongoing
twelfth (2011-2015) exhorts “speeding up implementation of the going out
strategy” ( jiakuai shishi zouchuqu de zhanlüe 加快实施走出去的战略 ), as
Jin has noted. Thus over the past decade, this “going out” phenomenon has
gained increasing economic and political significance.
But this evolution has had its share of difficulties and challenges, as ac-
knowledged in large measure by participants in a conference organised by
the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, whose pro-
ceedings were summarised in the Contemporary International Relations jour-
nal. As Mei Xinyu (article 3) notes, the most important problems linked to
Chinese firms “going out” are the risks of violence ( baoli fengxian 暴力风
险 ), in concrete terms violence aimed at enterprises and workers from China
in the host countries. Both Tao Jian (article 1) and Mei Xinyu (article 3) hold
that as Chinese firms are late arrivals (houlaizhe 后来者 ) on the international
market, they find themselves in places (such as Afghanistan) or sectors (nat-
ural resource extraction) where violence and risk are especially high.
Violence also comes from other countries, especially Western ones, which
complain of the “neo-colonialist” nature ( xin zhimin zhuyi 新殖民主义 ) of
China’s “going out” strategy (article 2). Chinese scholars consider these re-
proaches and fears to be baseless and unjust. They are baseless because, say
almost all scholars and especially Jin Canrong, the process of Chinese firms’
“going out” is motivated by economic dynamics and not political ones, and
is carried out through contracts and exchanges for which Chinese entities
are accepted by host countries, creating “win-win” ( shuang ying 双赢 ) so-
lutions. Finally this process simply and naturally meets the stage of eco-
nomic development that China has reached. In Lin Hongyu’s description
(article 5) of the gradual dynamic of insertion in the world at large, Chinese
firms first ventured abroad for direct sales ( zhixiao shi 直销式 ) before po-
sitioning themselves overseas to bag contracts ( hetong shi 合同式 ), often
for infrastructure building, and now the “going out” process is taking the
form of direct investment abroad ( touzi shi 投资式 ).
Fears and reproaches directed against China are deemed baseless, as it
has merely followed the path traversed by Western countries and later by
developed Asian ones (Japan, South Korea, etc.). And the reproaches and
fears are unjust because, as Jin Canrong has noted, Western countries’ “going
out process” was helped along by their gunboats ( jianchuan lipao 坚船利
炮 ), and when firms from developed Asian countries set out on international
markets, they enjoyed the attentive care of their governments – unlike Chi-
nese firms. Moreover, China today is more open, especially to foreign in-
vestment, than most of its partners that accuse it of neo-colonialism, Jiang
Yong has noted (article 4). In Jin Canrong’s view, such criticisms seem to
stem from China having now become the world’s number two economic
power, and it faces the same criticisms as previous challengers of American
might, such as Japan. The fears are exacerbated by the cultural gap between
China and its partners, especially Western ones, but also because China is a
socialist state, a point also made by Lin Hongyu (article 5).
This does not mean China’s going out strategy is all smooth sailing: quite
the contrary. First of all, although it is an economic dynamic, this “going
out” by Chinese firms has highly political consequences. Such politicisation
must be kept in sight and the strategy honed accordingly. Li Yonghui (article
9) dwells at length on the links needed between the companies and official
diplomacy, the firms becoming, in a way, diplomatic agents and the gov-
ernment supporting their “going out” through its programmes. The aims of
this trade diplomacy are clear, in the view of all the scholars: to smooth the
context in which China’s “going out” takes place.
Many solutions have been suggested. Transparency has to be infused
into Chinese firms and their motivations clarified (Jiang Yong), and they
must be engaged in local development, for instance by financing devel-
opment projects (Li Yonghui). They must also bring China and the host
countries closer, by spreading Chinese culture and by training Chinese peo-
ple to get acquainted with the host people (dangdi tong 当地同), Tao Jian
and Li Yonghui have suggested. Li also calls for strengthening multilateral
cooperation, especially at the regional level, and by working with non-
governmental organisations as well as civil society. Finally, despite the
peaceful nature of China’s “going out,” there is a need to put in place a
real military force projection capacity ( wuzhuang liliang de yuancheng
toufang nengli 武装力量的远程投放能力 ), not to threaten other countries
but to protect Chinese nationals where necessary, as for instance in Libya,
says Tao Jian (article 1).
Apart from this political and diplomatic dimension of the “going out”
strategy, which remains crucial, the scholars identify three other elements:
the management of Chinese enterprises’, Hong Kong, and internationalisa-
tion of the renminbi.
While a facilitating political strategy is necessary, Chinese firms them-
selves also need to change, creating conditions for becoming high-perform-
ing multinationals and improving their position in the global value chain
( quanqiu chanye jiazhi lian 全球产业价值链 ), Fan Libo (article 7) avers. And
Zhang Yucheng notes that Hong Kong continues to fulfil its traditional roles,
that of an interface with the rest of the world and of an advanced place on
international capital markets. This implies not only the development of its
economic capacities but even more its special and autonomous adminis-
trative and political status, which give it the means to keep its international
position and incidentally contribute to ameliorating the PRC’s global image.
As for the renminbi, Zhao Qingming (article 6) goes against the current
of dominant opinion, arguing that its internationalisation will be more a
gradual result of, rather than a necessary condition for, Chinese firms “going
out.” Other countries’ experiences show that if these firms, rather than the
Chinese government, could gradually boost their use of renminbi in their
transactions with foreign entities, it would be unnecessary to attempt forced
internationalisation through off-shore centres using the currency. Besides,
the main obstacle to the renminbi’s internationalisation is something that
often seems like China’s greatest strength at present: its trade surplus. The
imbalance in China’s economic relations with the rest of the world precludes
the renminbi from becoming a stable currency: it is subject to speculation
and cannot be a currency of reference. A significant increase in its use world-
wide would be predicated upon resolving the Chinese economy’s internal
and external imbalances.
Chinese enterprises’ “going out” has clearly been such a major develop-
ment over the past decade that it has emerged as a veritable political phe-
nomenon and has to be seen as such. Experts at the conference were
unanimous that the main concern has to be to ensure that the process takes
place in a peaceful atmosphere.
z Translated by N. Jayaram
